Does Scotland really needs a referendum to get its independence? After all, they didn't need a referendum to join the union? (Quora)

Our island history is of a long series of ‘Unions’.

When Dalriada was united with Pictland to form Alba, was Alba one country or a union? When Alba was united with northern Northumbria to form Scotland, was Scotland one country or a union? When Northern Strathclyde was incorporated into Scotland, was the resulting country then a union? Likewise, when the Western and Northern Isles were incorporated into Scotland? Did each and every one of these former countries retain a right to secede?

Meanwhile further unions were taking place in the south to form a country called England out of countries called Wessex, Cornwall, Kent, Essex, Mercia, Northumbria, Rheged etc. Wales was the last piece to be fitted into this jigsaw.

I think it is quite important to mention these earlier amalgamations, because current discussions seem to take for granted that all of England is culturally the same, or that there is only one historic culture in Scotland.

Eventually the island consisted of only two kingdoms, each of which came first under the same rule, (effectively putting an end to border reiving, because malefactors could no longer flee from one king’s jurisdiction to the other’s), and then the two of them united together into one country called Great Britain.

What exactly is supposed to make the union, in 1707, of these two remaining kingdoms somehow different from all the unions between then-existing countries on this island that went before?

And incidentally, since both the formerly-divided former kingdoms of Northumbria and Strathclyde were at long last actually reunited in 1707, should we, as an alternative option, be offering a referendum to their residents to ascertain if they want to be split up again between their respective former owners?

The upsides of lockdown in Scotland

 

I have repeatedly thought how blessed I am to live on a smallholding in pleasant rural surroundings. If I’d been through lockdown in a town flat, I’d probably have gone stir crazy.

Being obliged to remain in one place rather than ranging far and wide, especially at holiday time, persuaded me to take a more detailed interest in my immediate surroundings.

For no very obvious reason, I settled on hoverflies, joined the reporting group on Facebook and learned enough to identify thirty-seven local species. Then, of course, I forgot a lot of what I’d learned over four winter months when there were none at all to be seen. It’s beginning to come back to me now we’re well into Spring.

I spent more time gardening, with mixed results. I suppose I learned more about what won’t grow at this altitude and latitude, and at last got time to experiment with a few plants I’ve long wanted to try, particularly Lychnis chalcedonica, also known as Maltese Cross, which tradition says was brought to Europe by the Knights of Malta. My squash has not been a huge success though. I really suspect the growing season up here (at 600 feet) is just too short for it.


I also decided to learn Italian on Duolingo. I’m not sure when, or even if, I’ll have the opportunity to use this new skill, but I have usually found learning something new to be a pleasure, and this has been no exception.

Not strictly a consequence of lockdown, but the imposition of high US tariffs on imported Scotch seems to have diverted quite a few nice single malts on to the domestic market at discounted prices. I still can’t afford a lot, which is just as well, but I can’t say that the odd sip of an evening hasn’t helped lockdown pass more easily.

Scottish independence: the question of currency

Strictly speaking, a country only has rights over its currency within its own boundaries. Any country may use as its own currency a portion of any other country’s money supply that is available externally. Panama, for example, uses the US dollar, as did Zimbabwe for some years.

There is, therefore, nothing to stop an independent Scotland using the pound sterling, the yen or the Zambian kwacha except the difficulty of getting hold of enough money supply to serve all her economic needs.

However, a problem that arises for countries without their own currency is that they cannot create additional money supply for themselves and so they must run a balance of payments surplus (acquire more money supply) before they can expand their economies other than by the short term expedient of running down their foreign currency reserves.

In passing, it should be noted that Scottish banks already need to back their note issue with sterling on a 1:1 basis, but it is unlikely that this licensing arrangement would survive independence, so all notes circulating thereafter in a Scotland still using sterling would probably have to be Bank of England notes. Of course, the great bulk of money supply is not notes anyway, but bank deposits, etc. The principle is essentially the same.

A second problem is that there is absolutely no obligation on the country of origin of the currency to take account of the needs of the unofficial user when setting its own monetary policy. This effectively enforces fiscal rectitude on the secondary user, which cannot simply ‘print’ money, unlike a country that has its own currency. Quite often this is the reason for using a foreign currency: a country which, for political reasons, finds it hard to control its spending and thus risks severe inflation can force itself to ration the available money supply if it can’t make any more.

So, whilst no-one could force an independent Scotland to abandon sterling, a consequence of retaining it would be allowing monetary policy to be dictated by the UK government and restricting fiscal deficits to the size of available new sterling supplies. That’s not very independent, frankly. In fact, it’s probably less independent than the present degree of Scottish devolution.

On the other hand, starting a new currency involves a lot of irrecoverable sunk costs. These may be one-off, but they still need to be financed. And borrowing in the new currency would initially have to be very cautious, because otherwise its forex value could be volatile.

I don’t want to get started on the consequences of adopting the Euro. No, seriously, don’t ask.

Scotland, the pound and the euro

Tobermory, Mull, Scotland

After independence, either of these options effectively involves Scotland using a foreign currency as the domestic currency.

Europhiles will tell you that the Euro is the domestic currency of all its members. This is theoretically true and for all practical purposes absurd. In practice, the Euro is a DMark-lite and the German economy is hugely more influential in determining its Forex value, monetary policy and ultimately fiscal policy than any other member.

A country that uses a foreign currency as its domestic currency forfeits the right to determine its own monetary policy. It is not possible to set a monetary policy for several countries at once unless those countries form an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). This means (inter alia) that there must be no significant obstacles to labour and capital mobility between the members, there should be wage flexibility between the members, and the members have more or less synchronised business cycles. Where these conditions do not obtain, there will be a need for a mechanism of fiscal transfers between the members to mitigate the damage that an inappropriate exchange rate and monetary policy will do to the weaker economies.

At present, the Eurozone lacks a number of features that enable an OCA to function effectively. Hence every few years we have a Eurozone crisis from which one or more weaker economies emerge worse off.

Scotland could be considered to be more of an OCA with the rest of the UK than with the EU. Language is always an important barrier to labour mobility; another is the portability of pension rights. Currently, Scotland has both of these links with the UK, with which it also does almost four times as much trade as it does with the EU. The UK business cycle is regularly out of step with the EU business cycle because, unlike almost all other EU member states, the UK does more trade outside the EU than within it.

As a member of the UK, Scotland has been marginally disadvantaged by using the same currency as the rest of the UK but has received compensating fiscal transfers. This has avoided excessive unemployment or depression of wages compared to the richer south.

(To forestall political objections to the foregoing sentence, let me point out the simple fact that it is less cost-efficient to buy and sell in low population densities, which is much more typical of Scotland than England).

Luxembourg

Once it is a non-member of the UK, such fiscal flows to Scotland would presumably cease, unless a transitional agreement with the UK were to be negotiated. Moreover, there would be no obligation upon the UK to consider the impact of its monetary policy upon Scotland. Continuing to use the pound after independence in these circumstances (without the above mitigations) would probably lead to additional downward pressure on Scottish wages and employment, but not so great as the impact of joining the Euro. (Consider the impact of the latter upon Greece, Italy, and Spain for example.)

I have suggested elsewhere that the UK single market could survive Scottish independence. This would be to Scotland’s considerable advantage. However, the UK single market could not survive Scottish membership of the EU single market, which requires ring-fencing. In the latter circumstance, Scotland, like any new EU member (not to be confused with existing members who have exemptions) would be required to join the Euro. So not only would there be a hard border with England, but there would also be a change of currency at the border. This is a really bad idea unless you want Scotland to be poor.

Scotland and the Pound

I received an abusive comment on Quora , which maintained that the pound was as much Scotland’s as England’s. Please permit me to clarify:

Yes, the pound is as much Scotland’s as it is England’s, which is to say, not at all. The pound is the currency of the United Kingdom, the laws of which include a currency union created by and subject to that same set of United Kingdom laws.

Monetary policy within the UK is the responsibility of the Bank of England under a series of Acts of the UK Parliament. For example, though the Bank of England has a legal monopoly of the note issue, Scottish commercial banks are allowed to issue notes under licence. Under the 2009 Banking Act, they must hold sufficient reserve assets (Bank of England notes or gold) to maintain the value of their notes in the event of commercial failure. This is because, strictly speaking, Scottish notes are not legal tender but promissory notes.

Just as withdrawal from the EU would leave the UK no longer subject to EU law, withdrawal from the United Kingdom would leave Scotland no longer subject to UK law, which includes the laws governing the currency union and the laws governing the note issue.

An independent Scottish government could choose to issue a currency called pounds, but it could not choose to issue UK pounds since it would no longer be part of the UK. (There is no prospect of Scotland being recognised as the continuing state as opposed to the ten times larger population from which it would have withdrawn, which would continue to be governed by UK law.) The Scottish pound would thereafter become, domestically and internationally, a separate currency from the UK pound. The exchange values of the two currencies could diverge.

Regarding sterling, Scotland would have two options:

1. To ask the rUK to continue the currency union, which was what the then Chancellor specifically ruled out in 2014, or


2. To use UK sterling (now a foreign currency) within Scotland as Panama currently uses the US dollar. This places monetary policy in the hands of the issuer of the currency, that is to say, the rUK.

Is it more important for Scotland to be in the EU or the UK?

The question begged here is more significant than the question asked, isn’t it? Could an independent Scotland get into the EU? There are several reasons why it might not, and all of these have been rehearsed ad nauseam. Is it worth going over them yet one more time? Probably not. It’s a complete dialogue of the deaf. Essentially it boils down to a disagreement between SNP supporters (who see no obstacle to anything) and unionists (who see obstacles to everything.)

Realistically, it seems far from certain that the option assumed in the question is actually available just for the choosing, especially in the short term. Pragmatically, an independent Scotland must be prepared for membership of neither union.

Perhaps we could look at the people involved instead of the economics. Scotland’s current residents include around 475,000 British nationals from other parts of the UK. Meanwhile, about 720,000 Scots live elsewhere in the UK. Intermarriage for 300 years has produced a very large number of people of mixed Scottish/other-British heritage and today’s British families (including my own) can comprise persons born on different sides of the border.

All of a sudden upon independence, a million and a quarter people would find they no-longer lived in their own country. One of them would be me. Personally, I find the prospect devastating.

Neither group of ‘exiles’ could be deprived of their present nationality against their will. An independent Scotland can offer Scottish nationality to non-Scots-born residents of Scotland, or possibly to Scots-born residents of the rest of the UK, but it cannot force it upon them.

In fact, it must be legally dubious whether a Scottish government could even force nationality change on Scots-born unionists. In the short term at least, a British passport is likely to be more valuable to travellers than a Scottish one.

It is therefore not beyond the bounds of possibility, in the event of a narrow vote in favour of independence, that the subsequent Scottish population would be almost equally divided between Scots and resident aliens.

We’ve recently had cause to notice how well the dividing of a population almost equally across passionately-felt identity lines has gone, I guess?

Did Scottish people originally come from Ireland?

Some of them did.

The name Scoti was originally a (4th century AD)Latin term for Gaels who raided Roman Britain from Ireland. By the 5th century these Gaels had formed a kingdom (Dalriada) which straddled the relatively narrow channel between north-eastern Ireland and south-western Scotland. However the country now known as Scotland was, in the Dark Ages, divided between these Gaels and several other races including Strathclyde Britons (Celts) forced north by the saxons(whilst other Celts remained in Wales and Cornwall), Norse moving south from Orkney and Shetland, Picts who occupied most of the central and northern highland areas and Angles moving north from Northumbria. A separate Viking group colonised Galloway. These disparate groups sometimes fought and sometimes didn’t.

Legend has it that in the mid-ninth century a Dalriadan king called Kenneth the Hardy was defeated in battle by the Picts, who were then attacked in the rear by a Viking army. The Vikings won, but as was their habit, then retired to the sea rather than holding the land. Kenneth’s army was now in better shape than the Picts and he was able to take over Pictish territory, becoming the first king of a united Alba (Dalriada + Pictland = just about all the mainland north of the highland line). Nowadays there is controversy about whether this amalgamation of the two kingdoms actually did occur by war or by dynastic marriage or some other process and not everyone considers Kenneth (MacAlpin) the first king of the unified land.

It took a lot longer for the lowlands (Strathclyde and the Lothians) to be incorporated into the kingdom and longer still for the Norse settlements in the isles of the west and north to be included too. Long before this process was complete it was complicated by the arrival of Normans who had already conquered England and who also invaded Ireland.

In the 17th century the colonisation process was reversed as protestants from Scotland were settled in Gaelic Ulster, which had been difficult to govern from the British side of the water.

The famine of the 1840’s set off more emigration from Ireland and significant numbers came to Scotland in a second wave of Irish settlement. Many got no further than Glasgow and surrounding west coast towns, most engaging in manual labour in the newly expanding industries.

So whilst numerous Scots today are of Irish descent, many others are descended from the various races that were amalgamated into the kingdom. These various strands are nowadays thoroughly mixed together anyway.

Nationality and Geography

Considerably to my surprise, my first attempt to produce an answer, as opposed to a comment, on a Quora Question has resulted in over 12,000 views and 1,000 upvotes. In part my surprise derives from the fact that I first published my thoughts about Sir William Wallace on this blog in 2013. For some strange reason it appears more people get involved on Quora than read my blog - well, I never!

Anway, in response to my view that the so-called Scottish Wars of Independence were really an argument amongst competing Frenchmen, one reader suggested that a national element in these wars was undeniable. I replied thus:

Although today we understand nationality as having some sort of link with a geographical ‘home’, it is not at all clear to me that the same mindset applied in The Middle Ages. Let us remember The Dark Ages saw a continual series of great national migrations across Europe, including the Scots themselves who came originally from Ireland and did not establish military control over most of what is now called Scotland until the tenth century. The new Scots rulers imposed themselves on a diverse range of pre-existing peoples, including Brythonic, Angles, Pictish, Norse etc. The contemporary sense of group identity was mostly a function of tribe, and geography relevant only in the sense of the domain that a particular warlord was able to dominate. Fixed ‘national’ borders in the modern sense were not yet established.

Great Norman families held estates on both sides of what is now considered the Scottish border and hedged their bets by supporting both sides when claimants to the kingship of England and of Scotland clashed. De Brus himself changed sides back and forth, suggesting political expediency was more important to him than any principled sense of Scottish nationhood.

In this respect it is interesting to compare him with El Cid, now lauded as a Spanish patriot, who also switched sides more than once. Although the Cid’s successors in the struggle developed the notion that the Moors were foreign oppressors in order to unify their own side, it seems clear the Cid himself did not take that view.

A similar phenomenon during The 100 Years War was able to call forth a French identity distinct from the Norman French overlordship of much territory in what is now France.

I suggest it is more probable in all three cases that the geographical notion of ‘nationhood’ evolved and was deliberately cultivated by warlords during the wars of The Middle Ages and was thus an effect rather than a cause of those wars.

But any historical enquiry is best guided by evidence from contemporary sources. If (as is almost certain) I’ve overlooked some in the above theory, I’m only too happy to have it brought to my attention.

Carlisle – Calais without a passport

Scotland has a drink problem. Alcohol-related diseases, domestic violence, road accidents and other social problems are fuelled by booze to a level higher than other countries. Something must be done, obviously.

The Scottish government, famed for its keen grasp of basic economics, is reaching for minimum pricing as its solution. At a minimum price of 50 pence per unit of alcohol, the retail price of some currently-inexpensive strong drink will double.

Of course this will only apply to alcohol purchased within Scotland.

Obviously it will not occur to any canny Scots that there are fair-sized cities just south of the border, where the price of alcohol will not increase.

Nobody will order cases of wine from English wine merchants.

There are no border patrols to prevent the import of English booze, so absolutely no-one will take up a lucrative new career running alcohol.

Similarly no cash-and-carry warehouses will be set up in northern England to exploit the situation.

Since there won’t be trucks full of liquor crossing the border in a northerly direction, no cheap alcohol will conveniently fall off the backs of lorries in the vicinity of unlicensed premises.

And in future all the whisky drunk in Scotland will be made in Scotland, driven over the border, sold, bought and driven back first.

I do hope the police force and the inspection authorities are currently underworked or that there is lots of money available for their expansion.

No? Didn’t think so.

On second thoughts, maybe I’m confusing the government’s alcohol-limitation programme with a job creation scheme.

What's The Laffer Curve?

All except one of the political parties at Holyrood appear to be agreed on the need for higher taxes to finance public services. Apparently we ought to be asking ourselves ‘What sort of country do we want to be?’

Now in any economy there are generally more far more poor people than rich people. If you ask the majority whether they would like something for free and would like the minority to pay for it, it would be quite surprising if you got a negative answer.

However to pose such a question actually begs a logically prior one. Will the rich minority be happy to stick around and pay up?

Scotland already taxes businesses more than the rest of the UK and has a lower threshold for the top rate of income tax. Without more detailed analysis it would be simplistic to suggest that its relatively high taxation is a significant contributor to Scotland‘s growth rate lagging behind the UK average. I suspect however most economists would agree that the impact is most unlikely to be positive.

Further tax increases may damage investment and encourage businesses to locate on the southern side of the border. Mobile workers may follow.

If personal taxes are raised, self-employed Scots may start to consider forming companies so as to pay business tax to the UK government instead of income tax in Scotland.

In short, there’s a danger of passing the point of peak revenue in Scotland’s Laffer Curve; not only might putting taxes up reduce government revenue, it may reduce the tax base itself.

We should bear in mind that it was Scottish choices on issues like student fees and care for the elderly that led to a situation in which Scotland spends about £1,300 a head more than England.

Perhaps it’s time to ask ourselves not ‘What sort of country do we want to be?’ but ‘What can we actually afford?’

Minority Government Options

I understand the distaste in some quarters for a government to be supported by the DUP. But consider please what Scots would have to endure if Labour were to do a deal with the SNP. 63% of us have just voted against the SNP, sending a very clear message that we don't want another referendum. Would Labour give them one anyway in order to get into government?

So far as I understand it there is no threat of a CON + DUP coalition, the proposal is for a 'confidence & supply' arrangement. This does not involve importing DUP social policy into mainland Britain. Almost certainly, I should have thought, the price they will exact is a soft border with Eire after Brexit.

When eating with the devil, use a long spoon. Of the two deals with two devils likely to be on offer in the short term, I'm inclined to feel one of the alternative spoons needs to be substantially longer.

Fortunately the Northern Irish peace process has two referees not one. The role of the second referee is automatically strengthened when the NI Assembly is suspended and I suspect that any error by referee one would very speedily result in an appeal to referee two.

Secondly the price likely to be demanded by the DUP (see above) is not politically controversial in NI as far as I know. No-one is likely to complain if they extract this concession. Note that it is a big concession. If you must have agreement on the NI border then you cannot carry out any threat to walk away without a deal.

Thirdly, should anyone ask why Unionist Scots are afraid of another referendum given they should win it easily, I reply that no-one who did not experience the gut-wrenching unpleasantness of our last referendum can possibly understand. We are trying vainly to rebuild our community with the threat of another vitriolic campaign constantly hanging over our heads like the sword of Damocles.

Fourthly, as I've said before, referenda settle nothing. The losers never accept the democratic verdict and go on campaigning as though nothing had happened in the hope of wearing down the majority will by sheer importunity. Frankly I'm with Brenda from Bristol. We've had enough!

What we actually need is a grand coalition in which the two large parties come together for the duration of the Brexit talks and sort out a common British negotiating position. 

We Are The People

Anthropologically speaking, it is not at all uncommon for a primitive tribe to call itself 'The People' or sometimes 'The Human Beings'.

By definition in a tribal society, everyone who is not of 'The People' is an enemy. The tribal leaders are able to achieve a high degree of loyalty from their members, on the one hand by claiming that they know from their experience and wisdom what is best for 'The People' and on the other by maintaining an implied threat to exile any dissident, cutting them off from 'The People' and sending them out into an alien and hostile world.

Important problems present themselves for tribal leaders as members grow more sophisticated and begin to interact more with other tribes, for example by trading with them rather than just fighting them in the traditional way.

First, alternative sources of authority and alternative truths will be presented to members of the tribe. It will become obvious that other tribes have contrived to prosper without necessarily following the methods prescribed by the leaders of 'The People'.

Secondly, the tribal territory may become less precisely defined.

In the early tribal period of course nomadism precluded any notion of owning land. Once the tribe settled down to a more sedentary agricultural existence it was necessary to introduce at least a communal land-ownership concept in order that those who worked to grow food should also be able to enjoy eating it.

However once tribes begin to mingle then there arises the problem of whether anyone who lives within the territory of 'The People' should be regarded as a member of 'The People' or not.

Perhaps however of greater concern is the members of 'The People' who gradually lose their subservience to their traditional leaders and begin to suspect that peaceful mingling with other tribes is potentially better than enmity.

At this point, in order to defend their power, the tribal leaders will usually try and start a war.

Sadly it seems the SNP administration have declared war on a very large segment of the population of Scotland, probably still the majority. Whatever the outcome, it will not be good.

No to Another Referendum

For those in Scotland who despair at the thought of having to go through all the misery again so soon after the last independence referendum:

The Holyrood petition against it is at this URL.


The UK petition against it is at this URL.

A cast-iron mandate

Nicola Sturgeon today claims she has a cast-iron mandate for another Scottish Independence referendum.

That mandate presumably dates from the 2016 Holyrood election, when her government lost overall control and became dependent on The Greens for a majority.

Yes, I know The Greens favour independence, but I'm inclined to wonder whether their voters had it top of their agenda when marking their crosses on the ballot paper. Presumably, if it had been their priority, these voters could just as easily have voted SNP.

Needless to say her mandate does not date from the 2014 referendum, where the nationalists lost by a 10% margin. At that time they claimed referendums were a 'once in a generation' event. It now appears that referendums will only cease once the SNP wins one, or alternatively when they are no longer maintained in power by The Greens.

Looking at the catastrophic mismanagement that ten years of SNP rule has brought to Scotland's economy and basic public services, we can well understand the need for another bout of tribalist shroud-trailing to distract the electorate. Nicola Sturgeon's own popularity is at last begin to flag too.

On the other hand the SNP has still not come up with an alternative plan for a national currency. Surely they won't try and run the busted flush of sharing the pound sterling for a second time?

Moreover the oil price on which the last projected independence budget relied has halved and it is now reckoned that an independent Scotland would have a fiscal crisis worse than that of Greece.

In the Middle Ages it was traditional for the Scots to invade northern England whenever the English were distracted by a European war, but reviving this opportunistic policy during the Brexit negotiations is doubly inappropriate.

Firstly it prevents Scottish voters having a clear idea of what relationship with the EU would be the alternative to independence. It still seems probable that Spanish and Belgian vetoes would be deployed to prevent Scottish membership either as a new member or a rump continuing member, so Scots would be voting for a pig in a poke on both sides of the ballot.

Secondly it complicates the position for UK and EU Brexit negotiators, neither of whom could be clear whether the UK government was negotiating for the whole island.

The truth is that the uncertainty caused by the Damocles sword hanging over the Scottish economy will deter inward investment until the threat of another referendum is removed.

And, perish the thought, should the separatists ever gain their hearts' desire, the outrage they claim to feel over being dragged out of the EU against their will is likely to be as nothing compared to the outrage of half the Scottish population dragged out of the UK against their will.

The So-Called Single Market

Right, let's be clear. There's no such thing as The Single Market. The other EU members call it The Internal Market.

Now if you're no longer a member of the EU you are, by definition, no longer internal. Therefore you cannot be a member of The Single Market.

Scotland cannot remain in the EU because Scotland, as such, is not a member at present. Scotland cannot therefore remain in The Single Market when the UK leaves.

What matters, to both the UK and to Scotland, is not membership but free trade. The UK has offered continuing free trade to the EU. This means the UK has offered the EU exactly what Scotland has asked for.

It is nonsensical doublespeak to suggest that Scotland's voice is being disregarded.

Moreover, since we already enjoy free trade with the EU and have offered to continue it, it is up to the EU, if it is determined to act against its own interests, to erect the first tariff barrier. No-one is suggesting that the UK, or Scotland, should make the first move.

Meanwhile several powers currently held by the EU will revert to the UK and it will make sense for some of these to be further devolved to Scotland. Fisheries is an obvious case in point.

In the worst case scenario, the EU may choose to raise tariffs against the 15% of Scotland's trade that is conducted with it.

How by any stretch of economic logic does it make sense for Scotland to respond to such a piece of stupidity by leaving the UK Single Market which is responsible for over 60% of our trade?

The oil price has already halved. How poor are we determined to be?

An Unwanted Record

A standard device for politicians who are asked an embarrassing question is to answer a different one. So when Nicola Sturgeon was asked about the GERS report showing the Scottish fiscal deficit was £14.8 billion or about 9.5% of GDP, larger even than Greece, she replied that the real threat to the Scottish economy was Brexit.

Aye, as they say, that'll be right. Scotland does about 15% of its trade with the EU and about 70% with the rest of the UK. We are happy to contemplate pulling out of the UK and really upset about pulling out of the EU?

As I pointed out at the time, the so-called White Paper Scotland's Future, despite predicting an absurdly high oil price, already predicted a fiscal deficit of £4.6 billion.

Take away the alleged bonus of oil revenues and we now need bailing out to the tune of well over £3,000 per adult per year. Fortunately as part of the UK we don't have to try borrowing that.

Meanwhile the Scottish Government embarks on another round of trying to persuade the voters that independence makes economic sense.

Yes. Quite. And whilst all this is going on, who's minding the store?

No More Referenda

As a general rule I am not an enthusiast for referenda. Experience shows them to be socially divisive blunt instruments, reducing complex shades of grey to simple black and white and arousing passions that are not easy to quell after the event. General elections give almost every voter some sort of stake in the outcome; few are left utterly without representation. By contrast a referendum is winner takes all, however small the majority.

The EU Referendum eventually became necessary because all the major political parties of the UK supported membership and for forty years opponents had no opportunity to vote against a process that steadily and deliberately eroded the sovereignty of their country. I suspect that a large majority of voters would still support membership of the sort of Common Market that we were told we were joining in 1973.

Inevitably the ordinary citizen, who has his own life to live, is not as expert in political matters as someone whose speciality is politics. The failing of our modern system of representative democracy has been the emergence of a class of professional politicians with no experience of the normal world in which their constituents live.

How else can you explain the geographical division of English voting between London's Remainers and the rest of England's leavers, or three quarters of parliament being Remainers when the country as a whole votes Leave?

Given that almost all the political, commercial and financial elite spent months predicting chaos if the plebs were stupid enough to vote to leave, it is a tribute to the resilience of the UK's economic system that the immediate aftermath of the Referendum was not greater instability than in fact occurred.

Just as in the Scottish Referendum, the losers are immediately enthusiastic for a re-run. Economically speaking, nothing could be worse. Prolongation of uncertainty is a self-inflicted wound which the country can do without.

Let us look for the opportunities of the future rather than hankering after a vanished past.

Don't Ignore the Price

This letter was published in The Falkirk Herald yesterday.

There are people who desire Scottish independence at any price. That is their right. Those who take a more pragmatic approach should think twice about demanding a second independence referendum in the event of the UK voting to leave the EU.

It may well be that, offered a choice between leaving the EU and remaining, a majority of Scots would vote for Scotland to remain, but that is not on offer. Scotland as such is not a member of the EU and thus cannot remain a member if the UK leaves.

A subsequently independent Scotland would have to negotiate for admission as a new member and our application would be subject to veto by Spain and other existing members worried about their own separatists. The likelihood is we should end up outside both the UK and the EU.

However, suppose that, against the odds, we were to gain admission. The result would be the erection of an EU border between Scotland and England. Since a major reason for the UK's exit would be to cut EU immigration, there could not be freedom of movement across that border.

As an EU member Scotland would not be allowed to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with the UK. The EU would negotiate for us and whatever deal they negotiated would apply to all EU members. There could be no special deals for Scotland.

EU rules require all new members to join the Eurozone. Even if the UK government were willing to allow a sterling monetary union to continue after independence, it would not be allowed. How many Scots really want to give up the pound and join a currency system that has strangled economic growth, plunged its poorer members into impossible debt and obliged its richer members to bail them out?

Given that the 2013 White Paper Scotland's Future looked forward to an oil price of $113 per barrel and still managed to show a projected fiscal deficit of £4.4 billion in the first year of independence, (in other words around £1,000 per adult member of the population), we may conclude that with oil prices currently in the region of $33 the Scottish fiscal deficit would now be eye-wateringly large. The present UK government's austerity would look like a spending spree by comparison with the cuts that would be required.

Unless the Scottish government reckons its people cannot do sums, the threat of a second independence referendum can be little more than a paper tiger designed to scare up extra votes for staying in the EU.

The EU Referendum and Scotland

I am disturbed by the glibness of the prevailing assumption that if Scotland votes to remain in the European Union and the rest of the UK votes to leave, it will be appropriate to hold a second independence referendum.

Some time ago I pointed to the damage inflicted upon inward investment to Quebec by the determination of defeated separatists to hold a referendum re-run. Political instability deters investment no matter how often the SNP claims otherwise. Since the European polls are evenly balanced and the Scottish polls not much clearer, we now have the worst of all possible worlds.

The fallacy of the assumption that Scottish enthusiasm for the EU will lead to the break-up of the UK lies in the conflation of these two questions. Just because a voter favours remaining in the EU it does not follow that he or she would vote for independence rather than see that wish thwarted.

So far as I am aware, no-one is being asked at the moment whether they would prefer to be in the EU or the UK. Even that would be a fraudulent question, since Scotland is not a current EU member and would not be accepted as such even if the UK withdrew. A breakaway Scotland would still be a new applicant for EU membership, as was repeatedly explained during the independence referendum.

Therefore the actual question should be: Would you like to leave the UK and take a chance that our subsequent application to join the EU would not be vetoed by Spain and other member states anxious to avoid giving encouragement to restless ethnic minorities?

Does it make any sense at all to erect a border against our largest export market, the UK, in order to retain free trade with much smaller markets in the EU?

Is it remotely credible that the UK would leave the EU in a bid to cut immigration and then allow freedom of travel across the border with an EU Scotland?

Bearing in mind the chaos of the currency question during the independence referendum, does anyone seriously believe the UK would exit the EU and allow Scotland to take sterling straight back in?

EU rules require new members to join the Eurozone. How many people really want to join a system that has strangled economic growth, plunged its poorer members into impossible debt and obliged its richer members to bail them out?

Simply to state these issues is to show the foolishness of the assumption noted in my first paragraph. I do worry however that Europhiles will harp upon this refrain until more and more people in Scotland assume that it must be true.

Common sense

He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much: and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much. (Luke 16.10)

Most parents are familiar with the idea of doling out responsibility in small does. See how a child handles something small before promoting him or her to something bigger. And so on and so forth until the child is an independent adult able to cope alone.

It is elementary practical logic to minimise risk. How many parents would appreciate being told by their daughter that although she's never been on a date before she must be allowed to stay out late, or by a newly-qualified son who's not even driven the family car to the local shops and back that he wants to drive it to Paris?

It may be thought insulting to compare the Scottish Government to a child, though some of their petulance when criticised is childish enough. In governmental terms however its lack of experience must be conceded.

Yet any attempt to challenge the SNP's administrative record of the last eight years is met only by an excuse that it has inadequate powers; too many decisions are still being taken in London.

What would you do with the new powers you're getting under the Referendum settlement?

Oh we're not getting enough powers.

Yes but what will you do with the fiscal powers you are getting?

We were promised more powers.

Really? Can you point out when and where exactly?

Look, we're only going to tell you what we'll do when we're in a position to do it.

Never mind about the mess we've made of police reorganisation; pay no attention to the dire straits of the health service; overlook the failures of the education system; forget about the crippling levels of student debt. Yes, we know that these are all devolved matters, we know we've been running them for years, but once we're responsible for everything, everything will be all right, you'll see.

Ladies and Gentlemen, please show me some competence in managing small things. That might encourage me to believe you.