Full Fiscal Autonomy?

During the Scottish Referendum campaign, the question of a sterling currency union was controversial. There were claims that the pound was as much Scottish as English, which were true but which cunningly sidestepped the fact that the pound is not English either. It is the currency of The United Kingdom.

In previous posts on this blog I have discussed the difficulties that are bound to beset two economies of disparate size and structure that attempt to share a common currency. I concluded that the Chancellor was right to rule out a currency union between the UK and an independent Scotland.

Current discussion about Full Fiscal Autonomy for Scotland has so far failed to recognise the same currency problem dressed up in different words. What will happen when a single UK monetary policy is undermined by a fiscally autonomous Scotland adopting a borrow-and-spend stance whilst UK policy is still following a strategy of deficit reduction?

The answer is to be seen in the continuing Eurozone crisis. Under the monetary aegis of Germany, Greece, with Full Fiscal Autonomy because nobody respected the European Stability and Growth Pact, borrowed excessively because borrowing was far too cheap relative to the performance of the Greek economy.

In consequence for Greece the financial crisis of 2008 speedily became a debt crisis. This week's efforts are but the latest attempt by the Eurozone leaders to kick the can down the road one more time, still without addressing the fundamental absurdity of linking Germany and Greece within the straitjacket of a common currency.

It should not have escaped anyone's attention that the Greeks blame the Germans for not lending them more, whilst the Germans are tired of what they see as Greek profligacy. Is it really very difficult to look a little way into the future and see insults being traded between the Scottish and UK governments in remarkably similar circumstances?

The oil revenues that were to be the foundation of Scottish solvency now look like pie in the sky and no-one has much idea how to plug the huge pending revenue shortfall. Vague appeals to the extra revenue that economic growth might yield in the longer term, even if they turn out to be more than just wishful thinking, cannot hide the fact that in the short term Scotland must either tax or borrow heavily, or more likely both.

Full Fiscal Autonomy is incompatible with a common currency. Before our half-baked, less than half thought-through devolution process goes anywhere near it we need a clear, written federal settlement and firm fiscal constraints upon the budgets of all UK member states.

Sum You Lose

The recent electoral success of the SNP throws the spotlight back on the question of Scottish independence. It seems few people remember that the economic forecasts of the nationalists were discredited within months of last year's referendum. Perhaps therefore a summary of the crucial points might be appropriate.

In December 2013 The SNP published Scotland's Future, a document long on words and short on numbers. Yet amongst the numbers it did contain, one received surprisingly little attention. It was projected that in the first year of independence the Scottish fiscal deficit would be £4.4 billion, or approximately £1,000 for every adult member of the population.

Remember that figure, it is important. At a time when people were blithely talking about being one of the richest countries in the world, creating a more caring society and setting up an oil fund for the benefit of future generations, the numbers actually showed that Scotland was already living beyond its means and proposed to go even further into debt.

In order to arrive at this deficit figure, they made assumptions about likely sources of government revenue. Large receipts were expected from taxes on Scotland's oil and finance industries, which together form a disproportionately large component of our national income. Assumptions were also made that Scotland would continue to use the pound sterling as its currency and that Scotland would run a Balance of Payments surplus. All four of these assumptions were flawed.

Official statistics were pessimistic about future oil prices, given the threatened slowdown of the Chinese economy and the rapidly expanding supply of cheap shale gas from the USA. Alleging deliberate manipulation of the figures to disparage the potential riches of an independent Scotland, the nationalists substituted their own oil price estimate (of over $110 per barrel). In fact the official statistics turned out to have been over-optimistic. In 2015 oil prices are in the range $50 to $60, around half the nationalist projection. So far from supporting an independent Scotland, the oil industry was soon in need of UK government help.

The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer challenged the assumption that Scotland would continue to use the pound sterling. He expressed himself poorly. What he meant to rule out was a currency union by which the rest of the UK would continue to underwrite Scottish finances. Fresh from the 2008 banking crisis in which UK taxpayers had been required to find £46 billion to bail out Royal Bank of Scotland, that was hardly surprising.

His lack of clarity was misrepresented as a threat. "No-one can stop us using the pound," Alex Salmond declared. This was of course true. Surprisingly he did not go on to explain that no-one could stop us using the dollar or the yen or the Zambian Kwacha either.

An independent country may use any foreign currency it likes, provided it can get hold of enough by means of a trade surplus. Panama, for example, uses the US dollar. All that you have to do is give up any desire to control your own monetary policy. If Scotland were to use the pound without a currency union it would have no choice but to accept UK monetary policy as its own.

It also means the Scottish government could only run a fiscal deficit to the extent that it could cover the revenue shortfall with reserves of sterling.

An odd sort of independence, you might think, that resulted in less economic powers than Scotland already has?

When the currency problem became clear, the large Scottish financial institutions announced plans to move their services to UK customers south of the border. This was not simply a brass plate technicality to comply with EU regulations as nationalists claimed.

Banking profits derive from the difference between the interest rates at which banks can borrow and those at which they can lend. Essentially a bank's lending operations create new money and most of the money supply in a modern economy consists of bank deposits, not cash. In order to perform these money-creating operations, banks must be within the jurisdiction of, and accept regulation by, the central bank responsible for that currency. A bank attempting to create new foreign currency would be acting illegally; it can only operate in a foreign currency to the extent that it possesses reserves of that currency.

The net result of this alleged technicality would therefore be twofold.

      1. Scotland's financial institutions would be responsible to the Bank of England and pay their taxes to the UK Treasury.

      2. Without financial exports it is unlikely that Scotland could run a Balance of Payments surplus. This would eliminate the Scottish government's ability to acquire reserves of sterling and thereby to run a fiscal deficit.

Now please remember the important figure that I quoted at the beginning of this article. By the SNP's own projections, the fiscal deficit in the first year of independence was to be £4.4 billion.

This was before accounting for the fall in the oil price and the loss of the financial services industry. It was before losing control of monetary and overall fiscal powers as a result of sterling becoming a foreign currency. This £4.4 billion deficit was actually a serious underestimate, perhaps not within several orders of magnitude of the reality.

Not only would a future Scottish government be unable to afford the promised fairer society, it would have to borrow improbable sums just to keep public spending at present levels.

Why improbable? Because in order to borrow you must first establish that you are creditworthy. Why might the international financial community suspect that Scotland was not creditworthy? Because the SNP threatened that if they did not get their own way on the currency they would walk away from responsibility for Scotland's share of the UK National Debt.

Let us leave aside whether one could throw over this debt without sacrificing Scotland's claim to a share of the national assets and infrastructure which that debt has financed, much of which is not located in Scotland and nearly all of which would need to be replaced by an independent country starting from scratch.

Let us also leave aside the fact that a country involved in a major financial dispute with an existing EU member would struggle to find an easy path to re-joining the EU.

Just consider this single point. What international lenders would offer reasonably priced funds to a new government whose first independent monetary act had been to deny any responsibility for debts accumulated jointly under the previous political union?

I am an economist. But of course I am also human. I might be wrong. To persuade me that I am, would enthusiasts for independence please not shout at me. Just show me your numbers.

And before you do, please check that they add up.

Goodbye Primrose Path

If you see a friend walking towards the edge of a cliff whilst playing a game of blind man's buff, what do you do? Call out a warning, I expect.

You might well be surprised and upset when your friend shouts back, "Scaremonger!" and continues to walk forward.

"No really, there's a cliff!" you call.

"Disgraceful negativism!" he replies, sticking his fingers in his ears and starting to hum "La,la,la - can't hear you!"

Separatists amongst Scots seem to believe that as long as you dress up market forces as pantomime villains and hang a sign round their necks labelling them 'English Tory Scares' you may safely ignore them. Economic laws do not apply in the land of Braveheart.

But isn't it really going a bit far to respond to relocation decisions from major financial institutions by continuing to shout 'Scaremonger'?

Just what counts as economic evidence if capital flight does not?

People who don't trust what might happen at the ballot box are voting with their wallets.

It might be a good time to remove the blindfold and take a look ahead.

Scottish Monetary Policy

If Scotland continues to use sterling despite no longer being part of a currency union, we will have no choice but to accept whatever monetary policy the UK decides upon.  There are 58 million in the UK and 5 million of us.  They will have no more reason to take account of a foreign Scotland when determining their monetary policy than the USA has to take account of Panama when determining theirs.

Deduct the forty odd Scottish Labour seats and the chances are that the next UK government is Conservative.  They will implement Conservative monetary policy in the UK and that policy will apply in Scotland because Scotland will not have its own monetary policy.

Perversely this means that, so long as Salmond’s Currency Plan B remains the use of sterling without agreement,  voting 'yes' in the referendum results in the imposition of a Tory government's monetary policy in Scotland.

Perhaps this is what he means when he promises that Scotland will get what it votes for.

No-one can stop us!

"No-one can stop us using the pound!"

That is true. No-one could stop us using the dollar or the yen either, if we chose to do so. It just wouldn't be smart. Neither would using the pound outside the UK currency union.

No-one can stop Panama and Ecuador using the dollar, so they do use it. But the dollar is a foreign currency, controlled by a foreign country. These two Latin American countries allow the USA to enforce fiscal and monetary discipline upon them because they can't easily do it themselves. They have to generate trade surpluses in order to accumulate domestic spending power. Their governments are not masters of their own economies.

So if Scotland wants to wrest control of monetary policy away from London only to hand it straight back again, this time with no influence over it whatsoever, then yes, no-one can stop us.

On the other hand, good luck generating the trade surplus needed to pay for the promised fairer society after the financial services industry has been forced to move south of the border in order to stay in the same jurisdiction as its lender of last resort. Most Scottish financial products are exported to the UK.

Good luck obtaining a fair share of The Bank of England's foreign currency reserves after you've refused to take a fair share of the UK national debt.

Good luck finding people to purchase Scottish government bonds when you've shown yourself likely to default whenever you don't get what you want.

But we can always console ourselves with the thought that no-one could stop us!

Scottish Referendum:Currency Plan B (for Broke?)

This is the text of my letter,  published in The Falkirk Herald last Thursday:

"It's Scotland's pound and we're keeping it," they say. We are still being treated like children who do not understand economics.

The pound is the currency of the union. It is not Scotland's pound, nor is it England's, Wales' or Northern Ireland's pound. Scotland proposes leaving the union. You cannot divorce and expect to retain the joint account. When you're single again you must establish your own account and pay your own way.

It's no good repeatedly telling your ex-partners that it's somehow in their interest to continue underwriting your debts; after the 2008 crisis they won't believe you.

If Scotland used the pound unilaterally we would have to accumulate pounds by trade, since our government could not create for itself an increased supply of a foreign currency. Failure to generate a trade surplus would thus preclude the blithely promised fairer society. You might want it, but you can't have it if you can't pay for it.

Without a central bank, borrowing would become more expensive, especially if the Scottish government followed through on its reckless threat to throw over responsibility for its share of the UK National Debt. Remember a Scottish Chancellor under a Scottish Prime Minister recently increased that debt to rescue The Royal Bank of Scotland. No-one lends cheaply to those perceived as defaulters.

Loss of financial sector jobs could easily run into tens of thousands, reducing tax revenues, increasing the Scottish government's need to borrow and raising interest rates still further.

Using sterling without agreement has costs. It's not just a matter of thumbing our noses at the rest of the UK and saying we'll do as we like.

Scotland and self-determination

If you confuse nationalism with patriotism, you are also likely to confuse self-determination with separation. Scotland was not conquered; a bankrupt country chose voluntary union because it desperately needed access to the financial resources of its more prosperous neighbour.

Those resources again rescued the country from bankruptcy as recently as 2008, when the UK raised £46 billion to save RBS.

That UK government was led by a Scottish Prime Minister and a Scottish Chancellor. Far from failing Scotland, it enlarged the national debt on Scotland's behalf. SNP leaders now threaten not to pay our share.

The sum needed to bail out a single Scottish bank contrasts with the half billion a year transaction costs the UK may suffer should it decline to share its currency.

It seems that, unlike the separatists, the UK government can do sums.

Scottish Independence - A Dialogue of the Deaf

Recent triumphalism from separatists claiming to be winning the argument is frustrating to people actually trying to think through the problems of independence. Rational discussion has not even begun. To date the so-called debate has been an emotional pantomime in which every claimed disadvantage is met by cries of "Oh no it isn't!" and little else.

To stress the risk of losing what we already have is not negativism. We have obtained certain advantages through the union. It is for separatists to explain either why we shall not be putting these advantages at risk or why it is worth it. Yet all we hear is flat denial of troubling claims such as those made by:

1. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the economic spokesman of the Labour party, who say that there will be no sterling currency union because it isn't in the UK's interest;

2. The Governor of the Bank of England who says that a sterling zone would require some ceding of national sovereignty in order to avoid the sort of financial instability that has hurt the Eurozone;

3. The Prime Minister of Spain and the President of the EU Commission who say that Scotland will not be an automatic member of the EU and will have to apply;

4. Economists who suggest that a refusal by Scotland to accept its share of the National Debt would lead to downgrading of our credit rating and a rise in our interest and mortgage rates;

5. The Institute for Fiscal Studies which says that oil revenues have been overestimated and Scotland cannot afford even current levels of public spending;

6. Financial institutions which have indicated that they may have to move south because regulations require their headquarters to be in the same jurisdiction as their largest market;

7. The Defence Secretary who says there is no guarantee that future UK contracts for warships etc. will be placed with a foreign country;

8. The former Secretary General of NATO who doubts that Scotland will be enthusiastically welcomed into the organisation whilst evicting Trident, an important part of NATO's defence strategy;

9. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland which has warned of major uncertainties for pensions after independence;

10. The Home Secretary who says there will have to be border controls and passport checks because continued free travel is incompatible with Scotland encouraging immigration whilst the UK discourages it.

These are just ten examples of warnings to which the standard response has been denial and accusations of bluff or bullying but not facts.

Let evidence now be brought forward. Let us hear detailed reasons why all these well-informed people are wrong. Until such time we may reasonably doubt that a rational, unemotional argument for independence has even been made, let alone won.

Currency unions are like joint accounts

I really did not intend to devote so much space on my blog to the economics of Scottish independence.  I feel obliged to do so because political spin doctors have been engaging overdrive in an apparent attempt to obscure the issues and reduce popular understanding. I have no problem with people making an informed choice.  I do have a problem with people being misled.

In my letter published in yesterday's Falkirk Herald I used the same metaphor that I have previously used on this blog.  When I compare a currency union to the joint bank account of a married couple, I do not of course mean to suggest that they are the same thing, merely that they have a number of helpful similarities.

Not many non-economists have a clear grasp of the nature of currency unions.  Indeed the history of the Eurozone suggests that either a fairly substantial number of economists did not understand these principles either, or that political confidence overwhelmed economic objections.  The disparate economies that were enclosed in the straitjacket of the common currency were simply not sufficiently closely aligned.  A certain number of conjuring tricks were employed to make the figures look reasonably convergent in the qualifying year, but everyone should have realised that the important issue was not the statistics but the underlying reality.

A decade of growth camouflaged the problem; it did not make it go away.  The long rolling series of near defaults was always going to happen. The fact is, that  two divergent macroeconomic policies cannot be accommodated within a single currency zone.

Non-economists will, I hope, find the problem simplified by my analogy.  Like our divorcing couple separating their bank accounts in order to prevent one party from spending the other's money, two countries each need their own currency in order to operate any approximation to an independent monetary policy.  The Eurozone went for the joint account first and  loveless political marriage seems bound to follow if they will not reconsider their mistake.

Scotland is a tenth of the size of the UK and any currency union between the two would never result in her being able to underwrite UK debts.  The UK would have no partners in underwriting Scotland.  In return for taking on unlimited liability the UK is offered freedom from exchange costs that at most would amount to a little more than 1% of what it cost the UK to bail out RBS alone.  Can anyone seriously claim that represents a good deal for the UK?

There is no economic justification for divorcing London in order to marry Berlin.  The Eurozone is going to tighten its political integration.  Unofficial use of sterling can only be a short term stratagem since it would deprive Scotland of any effective monetary policy at all. 

Independence means a new Scottish currency.  There.  It wasn't so hard to say it after all.

Read My Lips ...

I vaguely remember learning about the South Sea Bubble of the 18th century. Apparently back then there was such enthusiasm for floating new joint stock companies that people would even buy shares in 'a company to do something, nobody to know what.'

We are far less gullible today. I mean, no-one would vote for 'a country to have a currency, nobody to know what,' or 'a country to be in the EU, nobody to know how,' would they?

In the news this week:

• The Yes campaign's response to the refusal by all three UK parties and the UK Treasury to contemplate a currency union with Scotland is not to devise an alternative currency scheme. Instead they claim that nobody except the Yes campaign can do sums properly.

• They also point out that we may be dragged out of the European Union against our will by the 2017 in/out referendum. Safer to vote for independence and be sure, eh?

Since you couldn't make it up, it's just as well we don't have to.

Scotland's Currency Options

There has been much talk of the four currency options for an independent Scotland. Much that I have seen suggests that not everyone understands what the options are, let alone what advantages and disadvantages each has. Perhaps, leaving aside political issues for the moment, I might be allowed to outline them.

1. A sterling currency union means that both the UK and Scotland continue to use the pound by agreement. Between two economies of such unequal size as Scotland and the UK such an arrangement has little to recommend it except familiarity, (which was not enough to preserve the currency union of The Czech Republic and Slovakia after their political split.)

• It is not possible for a single central bank to operate two monetary policies. Market forces would oblige the central bank to pursue the monetary interests of the larger partner, even if political factors did not.
• Likewise neither partner could pursue an independent fiscal policy, because each government's borrowing would increase the common money supply. Agreement would be required.
• The UK would therefore have to cede a degree of its own monetary independence to Scotland. It has previously resisted doing this for the Eurozone, which is a much bigger market.
• An additional disadvantage would be each partner taking on an obligation to underwrite the finances of the other without the multinational burden sharing that is possible within the Eurozone.
• This is the option that the UK has ruled out. There are good economic reasons for ruling it out and no advantages for the UK that would come near to compensating for the loss of independence.

2. Informal use of sterling by Scotland means Scotland continuing to use the pound without the UK's agreement. This is the kind of arrangement used by Ecuador and Panama in respect of the dollar. It could not be prevented by the UK. It would avoid the introduction of exchange costs for trade within Britain, but is far from meaning that nothing would really change. Effectively it would take most of the so-called 'levers' of economic influence out of the hands of the Scottish government.

• It would not allow Scotland to create its own money supply.
• It would prevent a Scottish central bank from operating a meaningful monetary policy.
• Although this would also remove the need for UK government agreement of Scotland's fiscal policy, the same sort of constraints would be imposed instead by the need to obtain sterling through trade etc.
• It would remove the guarantee provided by the UK underwriting Scottish finances. This would imply a higher government borrowing rate for Scotland.

Thus neither formal nor informal currency sharing would allow a great deal of economic flexibility to the Scottish government.

Both formal and informal currency sharing would remove from the Scottish government's economic armoury the possibility of adjusting its exchange rate with the UK in order to absorb any imbalances that might develop.

3. A new Scottish currency is the only other option likely to be immediately available to an independent Scotland.

• This has a lot of short term costs and risks, including the introduction of exchange costs with the UK.
• However a more serious problem would be the need for the new currency to be underwritten by a Scottish government with no track record of debt management and which has incautiously flirted several times with the option of not taking on its share of UK National Debt. Possible lenders will remember perfectly well that a lot of the UK debt was incurred in bailing out Scottish banks and threats to walk away from responsibility for that debt can only raise the cost of borrowing by an independent Scotland.
• It might take some time to reassure foreign exchange markets that the new currency was 'hard', (i.e. it can be trusted to hold its value.)
• The new currency would also be a 'petrocurrency', (i.e. volatile and vulnerable to oil shocks.)

4. Joining the Eurozone is not a immediate option, because the entry conditions require two years' stable management of the domestic currency, a qualification which a Scottish government would lack. There may or may not be separate problems associated with Scotland's admission to the EU itself.

• It needs to be borne in mind that the Eurozone is just another currency union and that Scotland would be even less influential within this much larger zone than it would be in a sterling zone.
• Effectively monetary policy would be determined centrally and fiscal policy would be subject to the EU's Stability Pact.
• Even this has not been enough to preserve stability in the Eurozone of late and it seems likely that more political integration within the zone will be required in order to cement the stabilisation of the Euro as a currency.

Those, very briefly are the options. None of them are as advantageous as the present arrangement, but of course the present arrangement cannot be combined with independence.

Less Heat, More Light, Please.

Since last Thursday the currency issues in the independence debate have been, perhaps deliberately, obscured by emotional language. As I've said, we really do need to distinguish between a formal currency union and the informal use of the UK pound by an independent Scotland.

A currency union's price is financial interdependence because each member state may create new money. In the Eurozone we see a practical example. The short version of the lesson is: when some members overspend, those which do not overspend have no effective choice but to bail out their partners or risk the collapse of the whole system. 

The Eurozone is now being compelled by economics to pursue exactly the sort of political integration that is the opposite of the objectives of the 'Yes' campaign. 

The failure of the UK to agree a currency union with Scotland would not lead to exchange costs for UK businesses. Such costs would in fact result from a Scottish decision to adopt a currency other than sterling, as I discussed on 13 February.

Informal use of the UK pound by Scotland would be unlikely to lead to much greater financial flexibility however, since we could only obtain more money supply by means of a balance of payments surplus / net inward investment.

Quoting my article of 7 November 2013, "My judgement would be that a Scottish currency is the least of the evils, but that it requires preparation to start yesterday and much statesmanship from Scottish ministers."

Why no Plan B?

Let me try again to clarify matters affecting the currency of an independent Scotland. Two issues are still being confused: on the one hand the right of Scotland to continue to use the pound and on the other the continuation of the present currency union.

The Eurozone is an example of a currency union of separate states. All of the partners have the right to create new money; this means that none of them is financially independent and a financial crisis in Greece inevitably drags in the Germans who have no crisis of their own.

UK ministers and opposition have indicated that they find the prospect of a similar currency union arrangement with an independent Scotland unattractive because it would mean the UK losing financial independence just as Germany has.  The Scottish Government reply seems to be, 'They can't stop us using sterling.' This is true, but it does not mean that we can force the UK to accept a currency union.

An independent country may use any currency it likes, including a foreign currency, subject only to its ability to get hold of enough of that currency to meet its needs. For example Ecuador uses the US dollar. The US could not prevent this, even if it wished to do so.

The point being confused in the independence debate is that a country in Ecuador’s position cannot create US dollars. Were it to attempt to do so, the US would simply decline to recognise them as legal tender. This means that Ecuador's only monetary policy option is the monetary policy of the US, which takes no account of Ecuador when setting it. For the same reason Ecuador must operate under tight fiscal discipline.

If an independent Scotland wants to use the UK pound then we cannot be prevented from doing so, but in the absence of a currency union with the UK we could not create UK pounds since we should no longer be part of the UK. We should be in a similar position to Ecuador, with no monetary and little fiscal autonomy.

We could of course create Scottish pounds, but we could not force either the UK or the international exchanges to accept these at parity with the UK pound. The most likely outcome would be the circulation of both currencies inside Scotland, though it might be some time before the Scottish pound was enthusiastically accepted externally.

The more things change ...

I hope that amongst those whose enthusiasm for Scottish independence has more than a passing resemblance to support for a football team, some will take time to consider the issues before they vote.  I won't be holding my breath.

Those who make out a reasoned case are capable of entering into reasoned argument.  Those who behave like football fans are not.  I speak as a football fan.  There is no one who will ever convince me of the superior merit of an alternative team to my own.  I was born to support my team and it never occurs to me to waver. Whether we are bottom of the league and regularly thrashed or masters of all we survey, we are who we are.  That's why I refer to my team as 'we' and, as everyone knows, 'we' are permanently in opposition to 'them'.

I can afford to be so illogical because, fortunately, my livelihood is not at stake in matters of football. In matters of politics mixed with economics the issues are, hard though it may be to accept this, more weighty.

These are some of the issues that I wish to see resolved:

1) It is claimed that Scotland needs independence in order to lay hold of the important levers by which our economy is to be directed.  It is simultaneously claimed that we shall immediately hand back all of the monetary levers and a large proportion of the fiscal levers to The Bank of England and the rest of the UK. The Governor of the Bank of England seems to have confirmed this. Question: remind me again what is the point?

2) It is claimed that a currency union is in the interests of the rest of the UK because of the way it will simplify trade. Problem: it also makes the RUK responsible for the debts of the Scottish government, banks and public institutions and gives the Scottish government a say in UK monetary and fiscal policy.  There are quite good reasons for their refusing to accept this. Please explain to me why they will do it.

3) It is claimed that we shall automatically continue as members of the European Union, despite the claims to the contrary of, amongst others, the President of the European Commission and the government of Spain.  Bad news; this has to be unanimously agreed by EU members and the Spanish have a vote.

4) It is claimed that we could be added to the existing membership of the EU without having to accept the rules normally applied to new members, such as signing up to the Euro and the Schengen free travel area and that for some reason we would be entitled to a share of the UK's current budget rebate. Problem: in return for all their concessions, we are giving the other members what, exactly?

5) It is claimed that we shall continue to enjoy a common travel area with the rest of the UK, whilst adopting a radically different immigration policy from them.  Question: exactly how do we stop them setting up border checkpoints to enforce their immigration policy?  How much would consequent delays cost us?

6) It is claimed that we shall be able to go on financing our universities by charging fees to students from the RUK, despite the fact that EU law forbids discrimination against other member states.  Right.  So we think that they will let us get away with charging the English provided we don't charge the Bulgarians?  Seriously?

That's to be going on with.  When I hear the answers to these I'll start on the rest of the questions.