Scottish Referendum:Currency Plan B (for Broke?)

This is the text of my letter,  published in The Falkirk Herald last Thursday:

"It's Scotland's pound and we're keeping it," they say. We are still being treated like children who do not understand economics.

The pound is the currency of the union. It is not Scotland's pound, nor is it England's, Wales' or Northern Ireland's pound. Scotland proposes leaving the union. You cannot divorce and expect to retain the joint account. When you're single again you must establish your own account and pay your own way.

It's no good repeatedly telling your ex-partners that it's somehow in their interest to continue underwriting your debts; after the 2008 crisis they won't believe you.

If Scotland used the pound unilaterally we would have to accumulate pounds by trade, since our government could not create for itself an increased supply of a foreign currency. Failure to generate a trade surplus would thus preclude the blithely promised fairer society. You might want it, but you can't have it if you can't pay for it.

Without a central bank, borrowing would become more expensive, especially if the Scottish government followed through on its reckless threat to throw over responsibility for its share of the UK National Debt. Remember a Scottish Chancellor under a Scottish Prime Minister recently increased that debt to rescue The Royal Bank of Scotland. No-one lends cheaply to those perceived as defaulters.

Loss of financial sector jobs could easily run into tens of thousands, reducing tax revenues, increasing the Scottish government's need to borrow and raising interest rates still further.

Using sterling without agreement has costs. It's not just a matter of thumbing our noses at the rest of the UK and saying we'll do as we like.

Currency unions are like joint accounts

I really did not intend to devote so much space on my blog to the economics of Scottish independence.  I feel obliged to do so because political spin doctors have been engaging overdrive in an apparent attempt to obscure the issues and reduce popular understanding. I have no problem with people making an informed choice.  I do have a problem with people being misled.

In my letter published in yesterday's Falkirk Herald I used the same metaphor that I have previously used on this blog.  When I compare a currency union to the joint bank account of a married couple, I do not of course mean to suggest that they are the same thing, merely that they have a number of helpful similarities.

Not many non-economists have a clear grasp of the nature of currency unions.  Indeed the history of the Eurozone suggests that either a fairly substantial number of economists did not understand these principles either, or that political confidence overwhelmed economic objections.  The disparate economies that were enclosed in the straitjacket of the common currency were simply not sufficiently closely aligned.  A certain number of conjuring tricks were employed to make the figures look reasonably convergent in the qualifying year, but everyone should have realised that the important issue was not the statistics but the underlying reality.

A decade of growth camouflaged the problem; it did not make it go away.  The long rolling series of near defaults was always going to happen. The fact is, that  two divergent macroeconomic policies cannot be accommodated within a single currency zone.

Non-economists will, I hope, find the problem simplified by my analogy.  Like our divorcing couple separating their bank accounts in order to prevent one party from spending the other's money, two countries each need their own currency in order to operate any approximation to an independent monetary policy.  The Eurozone went for the joint account first and  loveless political marriage seems bound to follow if they will not reconsider their mistake.

Scotland is a tenth of the size of the UK and any currency union between the two would never result in her being able to underwrite UK debts.  The UK would have no partners in underwriting Scotland.  In return for taking on unlimited liability the UK is offered freedom from exchange costs that at most would amount to a little more than 1% of what it cost the UK to bail out RBS alone.  Can anyone seriously claim that represents a good deal for the UK?

There is no economic justification for divorcing London in order to marry Berlin.  The Eurozone is going to tighten its political integration.  Unofficial use of sterling can only be a short term stratagem since it would deprive Scotland of any effective monetary policy at all. 

Independence means a new Scottish currency.  There.  It wasn't so hard to say it after all.

Bailing Out Other Countries

Some people perceive double standards between the UK's bailout of Ireland in 2010 and its disinclination to accept a sterling currency union that would include an obligation to bail out an independent Scotland.

The economic logic is actually straightforward. Ireland belongs to the Eurozone. In 2010 the UK contributed about £7b of an EU rescue package of around £85b, in the process extracting the concession that it would not have to bail out Eurozone members again.

In a prospective sterling currency union of two, the whole of the burden of bailing out one partner would fall upon the other. There would be no obligation on EU members to contribute, any more than they contributed to the £46b UK bailout of RBS.

There is one other big reason for the UK not wanting to share sterling. The Bank of England cannot operate two monetary policies. For example, it could not simultaneously create a stimulus in Scotland and apply restraint in England. Money would simply flow between the two.

It is Scotland that is proposing to leave the UK, not vice versa. There are ten times as many UK Citizens outside Scotland as inside. There is no reason for them to let us take away with us a piece of their economic independence.

The more things change ...

I hope that amongst those whose enthusiasm for Scottish independence has more than a passing resemblance to support for a football team, some will take time to consider the issues before they vote.  I won't be holding my breath.

Those who make out a reasoned case are capable of entering into reasoned argument.  Those who behave like football fans are not.  I speak as a football fan.  There is no one who will ever convince me of the superior merit of an alternative team to my own.  I was born to support my team and it never occurs to me to waver. Whether we are bottom of the league and regularly thrashed or masters of all we survey, we are who we are.  That's why I refer to my team as 'we' and, as everyone knows, 'we' are permanently in opposition to 'them'.

I can afford to be so illogical because, fortunately, my livelihood is not at stake in matters of football. In matters of politics mixed with economics the issues are, hard though it may be to accept this, more weighty.

These are some of the issues that I wish to see resolved:

1) It is claimed that Scotland needs independence in order to lay hold of the important levers by which our economy is to be directed.  It is simultaneously claimed that we shall immediately hand back all of the monetary levers and a large proportion of the fiscal levers to The Bank of England and the rest of the UK. The Governor of the Bank of England seems to have confirmed this. Question: remind me again what is the point?

2) It is claimed that a currency union is in the interests of the rest of the UK because of the way it will simplify trade. Problem: it also makes the RUK responsible for the debts of the Scottish government, banks and public institutions and gives the Scottish government a say in UK monetary and fiscal policy.  There are quite good reasons for their refusing to accept this. Please explain to me why they will do it.

3) It is claimed that we shall automatically continue as members of the European Union, despite the claims to the contrary of, amongst others, the President of the European Commission and the government of Spain.  Bad news; this has to be unanimously agreed by EU members and the Spanish have a vote.

4) It is claimed that we could be added to the existing membership of the EU without having to accept the rules normally applied to new members, such as signing up to the Euro and the Schengen free travel area and that for some reason we would be entitled to a share of the UK's current budget rebate. Problem: in return for all their concessions, we are giving the other members what, exactly?

5) It is claimed that we shall continue to enjoy a common travel area with the rest of the UK, whilst adopting a radically different immigration policy from them.  Question: exactly how do we stop them setting up border checkpoints to enforce their immigration policy?  How much would consequent delays cost us?

6) It is claimed that we shall be able to go on financing our universities by charging fees to students from the RUK, despite the fact that EU law forbids discrimination against other member states.  Right.  So we think that they will let us get away with charging the English provided we don't charge the Bulgarians?  Seriously?

That's to be going on with.  When I hear the answers to these I'll start on the rest of the questions.

Scotland's Future

Imagine that you are a banker. (If you are not already a banker this may be hard, but please try.) On a certain day you have appointments with each of a newly divorced couple, both of whom require loans to help them on their separate ways. The divorce has been acrimonious and reported in the press. Partner A has repeatedly threatened to accept no responsibility for the debts incurred on their joint account, not even those incurred in making purchases on his own behalf. He has now changed his mind. Partner B has gone on settling all debts as usual. Bearing in mind that, as a banker, your first responsibility is the security of your own funds, to which of the couple will you be more inclined to lend?

Amongst all the sound and fury surrounding the launch of the White Paper 'Scotland's Future', one figure has received surprisingly little attention. It is projected that in the first year of independence the Scottish Government will require to borrow £4.4 billion.

This is the same Scottish Government that:

1. has repeatedly threatened not to accept a share of the UK national debt,
2. denies Scotland's responsibility for the actions of a Scottish Chancellor in raising the UK national debt in order to bail out failing Scottish banks,
3. is already spending beyond its means,
4. has promised yet more spending in pursuit of a fairer society,
5. is about to destroy Trident-related jobs by the thousand,
6. is committed to a currency union and thus will not be able to set its own monetary policy.

Are you still imagining that you are a banker? You are not of course a Scottish banker, since the major Scottish banks are no longer Scottish owned. You are a foreigner and this Scottish Government is asking you for £4.4 billion. This year.  Alternatively you could lend to the RUK government which also needs a loan.

Bearing in mind that, as a banker, your first responsibility is the security of your own funds, what will you do?

Scotland's Currency in a Customs Union

In an earlier article I suggested that a currency union does not make market forces go away, it simply diverts them into other channels. It so happens that a customs union is already diverting these market forces into other channels, so there is a shortage of alternative channels left available.

A customs union means that partner economies have no tariff barriers between themselves but have a common external tariff towards non-members, thus in principle creating a single domestic market. Let us assume that Scotland is admitted to (or remains a member of) the EU and that the rest of the UK remains in the EU after 2017. The EU is a customs union.

Whilst the EU single market is not perfect, the RUK and Scottish markets have long been one. Not only are goods and services traded freely between the countries of the UK but workers and capital also move freely.

A larger domestic market enables firms to produce on a larger scale and so make efficiency savings. The result is faster economic progress than the member economies could have achieved separately. However for poorer areas, membership of a customs union comes with a downside. If they can, most people will want to sell goods and labour in places where they receive more for them. This means that for trade between richer and poorer economies to continue in the long term, one or more of three possible adjustments must be made.

1. The simplest adjustment is for the less developed economy to run a balance of payments deficit with the more developed. The more developed extends credit to the less developed, effectively transferring funds to finance the continued purchase of its own exports. But a customs union has a single market. Scotland currently has no more meaningful a balance of payments with RUK than Yorkshire has with Lancashire.
2. The second possible adjustment is for the poorer country to devalue its currency relative to that of the richer. This makes the poorer country’s exports cheaper and more attractive in the richer country, whilst the latter’s exports become prohibitively expensive in the former. But within a currency union, Scotland’s pound could not be devalued against RUK’s, nor could Scotland's Euro be devalued against Germany's any more than Greece's Euro can be.
3. The third possible adjustment is for employment and national income in the less developed economy to fall to a level consistent with its relative inefficiency. Because this depresses the internal economy rather than adjusting the economy's external relationships, it is far more painful and ideally should be a last resort, allowing the two external adjustments to take as much of the strain caused by the imbalance as possible. Unfortunately inside a combined customs and currency union this third adjustment is not the last resort, it is the only resort.

Taken as a whole, the Scottish economy is somewhat less developed than that of England. This is an observation, not a criticism. It is structurally less diverse and hence more vulnerable to swings in the markets for its major industries, a phenomenon exacerbated by a disproportionately large (and currently weak) financial sector and the temporary as well as highly volatile effects of North Sea oil.

The discrepancy between the Scottish and English economies is of course as nothing compared to that between the Greek and German economies. Yet Scotland still needs to take note of what has happened to Greece inside a customs and currency union.

Currently within the UK, the old industrial areas are poorer than the south-east of England, but economies of scale created by our currency and customs unions raise national income sufficiently for compensatory transfers from richer to poorer areas to be politically acceptable. It would be difficult to make such transfers to Scotland after independence.

In summary, I am not sanguine about any of the currency options facing an independent Scotland. Nevertheless, in the event of independence, one of the options must be selected. My judgement would be that a Scottish currency is the least of the evils, but that it requires preparation to start yesterday and much statesmanship from Scottish ministers.

Sharing a Currency

A modern economy is based on achieving efficiency by specialisation and then exchanging produce with other specialists. A currency facilitates exchanges because it gets round all the problems of having to barter. You might therefore think that in principle it would be good to share a currency with as many as possible of those with whom you hope to trade. The problem is that a currency has to perform other functions too. For example it measures value and value is not the same everywhere and to everyone.

The Euro was the EU's response to the failure of attempts to fix exchange rates between EU members by means of the so-called 'Snake'. The Snake was overwhelmed by market forces. Politicians believed that this could not happen to a currency union. The truth is that a currency union does not make the market forces go away, it simply diverts them into other channels.

The Euro is not a currency in which all members are equal. For most of the Eurozone's members it is effectively a foreign currency except for the absence of exchange costs. Market forces do not give equal weight to small economies and big economies. This means that all along the Euro has been in reality a Deutschmark-lite.

If you use a foreign currency you also accept a foreign country’s monetary policy, whether it is appropriate for your economy or not. You cannot simply demand that the foreign country takes account of your needs if they conflict with its own. 

Inappropriately low Euro interest rates before 2008 therefore fuelled unsustainable credit expansion and property booms in several weaker economies than Germany that needed more monetary discipline. This contributed to a series of crises as soon as the currency union came under serious stress. Meanwhile for Germany the Euro offered an artificially lowered exchange rate that allowed faster export-led economic growth than was justified by German costs of production.

Just like the Euro in Ireland or Greece, the pound will be effectively a foreign currency for an independent Scotland whether or not a Sterling Area is agreed and whether or not parity of status is claimed by politicians.  RUK is about ten times the size of Scotland.   An independent Scotland using the pound will have to accept what will essentially be the RUK's monetary policy.

The claim that an independent Scotland would become entitled to a seat on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee is misleading at best. The independent status of the Bank (since 1997) precludes any government exercising influence over the MPC, which comprises Bank executives and independent economists. The UK Treasury representative who attends its meetings is not allowed to vote. Who could imagine that a Scottish government representative, even if allowed to attend, could have a greater role?

Scotland's Currency

A long time ago, when the earth was young and dinosaurs still stalked the uplands of Sliabh Mannan, I trained as an economist. I say this in order to justify a limited intervention in the independence debate. Mine is an economic commentary, not a political one. Substituting politics for economics was what led Europe into the débacle of its single currency and, since this precedent should not be emulated by the wise, I wish to examine the question of a currency for Scotland.

Any modern economy requires a currency. The fundamental choice is between one of your own and someone else's. Until recently, no-one was seriously suggesting that Scotland should adopt its own. In theory, creating your own currency is the only way to attempt monetary independence, since sharing a currency involves sharing sovereignty over monetary policy. In practice however, no open economy has full monetary sovereignty anyway, since the foreign exchange markets are too large for governments to control. It would not be impossible for Scotland to adopt its own currency. It would be expensive and it might be risky.

For a small and trade-dependent economy such as Scotland's, a new currency might seem an undesirable course, since it automatically introduces barriers to trade in the form of exchange costs. Unnecessary barriers to trade reduce the competitiveness of an economy and with it the standard of living in the country. To introduce barriers to trade with England, Scotland's principal market, would seem a bad way to start on an attempt to increase prosperity.

A new currency would also be vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations. It would be more vulnerable than sterling to oil price changes, since oil is more significant in the context of the Scottish economy than that of the UK. An erratic currency handicaps trade by forcing buyers and sellers to protect themselves against unpredictable exchange rate changes.

The currency might well be discounted against sterling until traders became confident of its stability (and this discount would be greatly increased should the Scottish Government carry through its 2013 threat to refuse its share of the UK National Debt). It seems not unlikely that Scottish interest rates would have to rise relative to those of the residual UK in order to defend the Scottish currency. Investment would thus be adversely affected.

In all probability an independent Scotland would therefore be obliged to use an existing currency. Given that the majority of Scottish trade would be with England it would make most sense to use the pound. The only viable alternative would be the Euro, which is currently enduring an unresolved long term crisis, rather like a householder who pushes filler into the cracks in his walls and resolutely refuses to inquire why they have cracks in the first place.

In a future article I shall return to the economic implications of a shared currency.